Wednesday 28 September 2011

How Pakistan Lost Its Top U.S. Friend


U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen has long been seen as Pakistan's closest friend in Washington

He visited Islamabad 27 times since 2008 in his role as America's top uniformed officer, cultivated a bond with the Pakistani army chief of staff and early in his tenure said he believed Pakistan was serious about plans to take on militant groups that the U.S. wanted shut down.

But in recent months, Adm. Mullen said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal, he concluded that the partnership approach he long had championed had fallen short and would be difficult to revive.

He took that conclusion to Congress last week, where he declared publicly what until then had been confined to private remarks: that Pakistan's military intelligence service is collaborating with a militant group that the U.S. blames for attacks on Americans, including the shelling of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on Sept. 13.

The shift by Adm. Mullen infuriated officials in Islamabad, who deny supporting militants, and cast a pall of uncertainty over the tenuous U.S.-Pakistan bond.

Explaining his switch in the interview, Adm. Mullen, like many other U.S. officials, said the Americans are now going to have to take a tougher line in demanding Pakistan rein in militant groups.

"I am losing people, and I am just not going to stand for that," he said. "I have been Pakistan's best friend. What does it say when I am at that point? What does it say about where we are?"

Adm. Mullen will step down this week after four years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position he reshaped through his outspoken views on U.S. wars, foreign policy and military policies, especially involving the repeal of the "don't ask, don't tell" ban on gays serving openly in the military.

But he leaves with a muddled legacy on Pakistan, an area he made a top priority because its border region has been a haven for al Qaeda and other militant groups intent on attacking U.S. interests.

He was disappointed when a major Pakistani offensive planned against Haqqani fighters in key tribal areas didn't happen, and a string of attacks by the militant group in recent weeks forced Adm. Mullen to drop his practice of refraining from public criticism of Pakistan.

Even now, though, he stressed that while Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has provided strategic support to the Haqqanis, they don't necessarily control the details of the militant group's operations.

"It is very clear they have supported them," Adm. Mullen said. "I don't think the Haqqanis can be turned on and off like a light switch. But there are steps that could be taken to impact the Haqqanis over time."

Early in his tenure, Adm. Mullen was more confident. He had hoped to integrate U.S. and Pakistani strategic, military and intelligence efforts, a goal that came to define America's role there. On many of his trips he was accompanied by Richard Holbrooke, who served until his death in December as President Barack Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

He also developed a bond with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of staff of Pakistan's army, amid roller-coaster relations between their countries, in which U.S. officials periodically accused Pakistan of failing to crack down on militants, and Islamabad defended its efforts and its sacrifices.

Adm. Mullen and Gen. Kayani worked out a plan for a Pakistani offensive this spring into North Waziristan that would have taken away a key haven from the Haqqani network, Adm. Mullen said.

But that timetable already was beginning to slip by the beginning of the year, only to be completely derailed by a pair of developments involving U.S. personnel in Pakistan, he said. They included the arrest of a Central Intelligence Agency contractor for shooting two Pakistanis, and the U.S. raid that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden.

Both incidents enraged Pakistanis, who complained the Americans were stomping on their sovereign territory. Adm. Mullen waited until after the bin Laden raid was complete before he called his Pakistani partner to tell him the news, and Gen. Kayani, though initially supportive, later came under fire at home for his own allegiance to Pakistan's U.S. allies.

Adm. Mullen acknowledges his approach didn't yield the results he wanted. "Each time I go I learn more," Adm. Mullen said. "But one of the things I learn is I have a lot more to learn."

In Pakistan, Adm. Mullen was often praised for what was seen as his willingness to listen to Pakistan's concerns, and his efforts to address them.


But the Pakistani view of Adm. Mullen has dimmed somewhat, particularly after last week's remarks.
"He's just one military officer in a country where they're always reminding us the military isn't in charge," said a senior Pakistani official. "I don't think anyone, any of us, are under the impression that he can snap his fingers and address our differences."

Adm. Mullen acknowledged in the interview that the tattered relationship with Pakistan was at a low point, and that the strategic partnership he championed would now be a harder sell in Washington.

"My view is long term we need to have that strategic relationship," he said. "But it's long term, and it is longer term now than it was just a few months ago."

Obama administration officials have sought to play down the impact of Adm. Mullen's public criticism of Pakistan in Congressional testimony on Thursday. But the State Department acknowledged this week that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship faces "very clear challenges."

The White House faces a particularly difficult balancing act, mindful that it can ill afford to risk forfeiting Islamabad's cooperation against al Qaeda.

The White House has sought to increase the pressure by withholding hundreds of millions of dollars in security assistance used by Pakistan to cover government expenses. It is unclear if that effort is bearing fruit. Pakistan has reached out to China and other allies in an apparent attempt to make up for lost U.S. support.

Adm. Mullen's work in Pakistan wasn't the most visible part of his job. He played a key role in toppling the ban on gays serving openly in the military, and was a key advocate for opening up submarine service to women.

During the Clinton Administration, another Joint Chiefs chairman, Gen. Colin Powell, opposed a White House initiative to allow gays to serve, citing possible damage to military cohesion and readiness.

But in February 2010, in testimony before Congress, Adm. Mullen said that allowing gays to serve openly "would be the right thing to do." It was wrong, he argued, to force people to "lie about who they are."

Adm. Mullen said in the interview that he began examining the issue of gays in the military during 2008, as the issue was raised in the presidential campaign. He began working out what his position would be.

"Quite frankly, it's a talent issue. It was fundamentally an integrity issue," Adm. Mullen said. "In that regard, it was pretty easy to both get my head around and speak to when the time came."

He began pushing for changes in U.S. war policies in 2007, soon after he was named to the post by President George W. Bush. Pointing then to the discrepancy in U.S. priorities, he said: "In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must."

Procedurally, the chairman's job is separate from the military chain of command. But under Adm. Mullen, his office became directly involved in helping shape war strategy and getting resources to troops in the field.

"History is going to judge him as one of the best and most consequential chairmen in our history," said David Petraeus, the CIA director and retired Army general who previously served under Adm. Mullen.

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